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Negative prim ing is reliably obtained with repeated 
items, but not with novel items. Here, we review why these 
stimulus repetition effects raise problems fo r  memory- 
based theories o f negative priming. Furthermore, we pro­
vide empirical evidence casting doubt on Neill and Joor­
dens’s (2002) claim that perceptual facilitation masks the 
effects of episodic retrieval with novel items. Finally, we 
discuss several theoretical and methodological issues 
raised in  the reply by Neill and Joordens. We conclude that 
a more straightforward interpretation o f these stim u­
lus repetition effects is one based on activation-sensitive 
inhibition.
In a typical negative-priming task, two stimuli are pre­
sented on each trial, and the participant is required to re­
spond to one stim ulus, the target, and ignore another 
stimulus, the distractor. In the critical ignored repetition 
condition, the distractor on trial N  (the prime trial) be­
comes the target on trial N+l (the probe trial). Perfor­
mance is slower and less accurate on ignored repetition 
probe trials than on control trials, defining the negative- 
priming effect (Dalrymple-Alford & Budayr, 1.966; Lowe, 
1979; Neill, 1977; Tipper, 1985). These early negative- 
priming studies spawned a sizable body of research, and 
several excellent articles are now available that review 
the negative-priming literature (e.g., Fox, 1.995; May, 
Kane, & Hasher, 1.995; Neill, Valdes, & Terry, 1.995),
The mechanisms underlying negative priming are still 
unclear, w ith theories falling into one of two general 
classes. Inhibition-based  theories describe negative 
priming as a consequence of processing on the prime 
trial (e.g., distractor inhibition, response blocking, etc.) 
that carries over into the processing on the probe trial 
(Houghton & Tipper, 1.994; Strayer & Grison, 1.999; Tip­
per & Cranston, 1.985), Memory-based theories describe 
negative priming as a consequence of proactive interfer­
ence from the retrieval of incompatible memories on the 
probe trial (M illiken, Joordens, M erikle, & Seiffert, 
1.998; Neill & Mathis, 1.998; Neill & Valdes, 1.992). These 
two approaches need not be mutually exclusive, although 
theories presently treat them as such.
Strayer and colleagues (Grison & Strayer, 2002; 
Kramer & Strayer, 2001; Malley & Strayer, 1.995; Strayer
& Grison, 1.999) have reported that negative priming was
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contingent upon stimulus repetition, because it was ob­
tained with repeated items, but not with novel items. In 
addition, we found that positive priming in attended rep­
etition conditions (i.e., a situation in which the target is 
repeated on the prime and the probe trials) decreased 
with stimulus repetition. These observations were taken 
as evidence for an activation-sensitiveinhibitory mecha­
nism that functions to reduce response competition on 
the prime trial (see, also, Houghton & Tipper, 1.994; 
H oughton, Tipper, Weaver, & Shore, 1.996; Tipper & 
Cranston, 1.985), Because little response competition is 
produced by novel prime trial distractors, the m echa­
nisms underlying negative priming are not engaged.
In addition, these stimulus repetition effects were con­
sidered by Strayer and colleagues to raise problems for 
memory-based theories of negative priming, particularly 
the episodic retrieval model developedby Neill and col­
leagues (Neill & Mathis, 1.998; Neill & Valdes, 1.992; 
Neill, Valdes, Terry, & Gorfein, 1.992). To understand 
the rationale for this assertion, it is important to remem­
ber that negative priming is measured as the difference 
in performance between a control probe trial and an ig­
nored repetition probe trial. On novel control trials, 
there should be no effect of episodic retrieval, because 
the stimuli have not been seen before (at least not in the 
context of the experiment). On novel ignored repetition 
trials, performance should be impeded by the retrieval 
of an instance generated on the prime trial that is in­
compatible with responding on the current probe trial. 
Accordingly, the negative-priming effect for novel items 
should reflect the full contribution of episodic retrieval.
By contrast, with repeated items there shouldbe m ul­
tiple instances of the stimuli used in both control and ig­
nored repetition trials. The precise effect o f multiple in­
stances depends on the processing assumptions of the 
model.1 If performance is governed by a race between 
all prior instances (e.g., Logan, 1.988), performance may 
be facilitated by compatible instances (i.e., a prior in­
stance in which the probe trial target served as a target) 
and impeded by incompatible instances (i.e., a prior in­
stance in which the probe trial target served as a distrac­
tor). Thus, on both control and ignored repetition trials, 
performance could be facilitated or impeded by episodic 
retrieval, and on average, the net negative-priming effect 
should be nil. That is, an episodic retrieval interpreta­
tion in which m ultiple instances are retrieved would 
have difficulty producing negative priming with a re­
peated stimulus ensemble.
Another possibility is that episodic retrieval is gov­
erned by the most recent instance (e.g., Neill & Mathis, 
1.998), In this case, performance on ignored repetition 
probe trials would be impeded by the retrieval o f in­
com patible instances, in a m anner sim ilar to that ob­
served with novel trials (see above). However, control 
trials could be facilitated if the most recent instance is
861. Copyright 2002 Psychonomic Society, Inc.
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compatible and impeded if  the most recent instance is 
incompatible. If an incompatible instance is retrieved on 
the control trial, the negative-priming effect for these 
trials would be expected to be nil, because both control 
and ignored repetition trials would involve the retrieval 
o f an incompatible episode. On the other hand, if a com ­
patible instance is retrieved on the control trial, the re­
sult would enhance the priming difference score, be­
cause performance would be facilitated on the control 
trial and impeded on the ignored repetition trial.2 The 
net “negative-priming” effect in the latter case would 
depend on the magnitude of the facilitation on control 
trials. However, given that positive-priming effects were 
absent in attended repetition conditions in which re­
peated items were used, the facilitation from a com pat­
ible instance is likely to be negligible, and the negative- 
priming effects should therefore be nil.
In short, without additional assumptions, it is not clear 
how models of negative priming that incorporate episodic 
retrieval can account for the stimulus repetition effects. 
Indeed, both recency-based and multiple-instance4)ased 
models appear to make predictions in the opposite di­
rection from that indicated by the empirical data (i.e., 
they predict greater negative priming with novel stimuli 
than with repeated stimuli).
Thin Ice
Neill and Joordens (2002) have developed an alterna­
tive explanation for why negative priming is not observed 
with novel items. According to this interpretation, the 
novel prime trial distractor (I) activates an internal per­
ceptual representation of that stimulus and (2) creates an 
instance in memory. On the probe tria l, episodic re­
trieval impedes performance; however, this is offset by 
the facilitation produced by the persistent activation of 
the internal perceptual representation of the distractor. 
That is, two separate (and additive) mechanisms are pro­
posed that have opposite effects on performance, result­
ing in a net effect of zero.3
In general, we believe that researchers are in a pre­
carious position when they suggest that two processes, 
neither observable, each operate to cancel the effects of 
the other. What evidence is there that episodic retrieval 
mechanisms are operating with novel items? What evi­
dence is there for the facilitation of novel distractors? 
Even if both episodic retrieval and representational ac­
tivation were operating with novel items, what evidence 
is there that the effects are of similar magnitude, thereby 
canceling out one another? The burden of proof is on Neill 
and Joordens (2002) to demonstrate these effects.
In fact, there are several sources o f em pirical evi­
dence that cast doubt on Neill and Joordens’s (2002) 
claim that sufficient facilitation is obtained with novel 
distractors to obliterate any impediments produced by 
episodic retrieval. Below, we exam ine some of these 
sources of evidence.
I. Strayer and Grison (1.999, Experiment I) obtained 
2 msec of positive priming in ignored repetition condi­
tions with novel items and 23 msec of negative priming 
in ignored repetition conditions with repeated items. If 
the representations are primed to asymptotic levels in re­
peated conditions, then according to the logic of Neill 
and Joordens (2002), an “uncontaminated” estimate of 
episodic retrieval would be 23 msec in this study.4 If the 
effects of episodic retrieval are the same magnitude for 
novel and repeated item s,5 the am ount of facilitation 
producedby a novel distractor would be 23 + 2 = 25 msec. 
That is, the 23-msec impediment producedby episodic 
retrieval would need to be offset by 25 msec of percep­
tual facilitation in order to obtain the 2 msec of positive 
priming in the novel ignored repetition condition. By 
contrast, the am ount o f positive prim ing obtained in 
novel attended repetition conditions was 50 msec. We 
are skeptical of the suggestion that a novel distractor re­
ceives 50% o f the perceptual facilitation of a novel tar­
get. If this were the case, it would imply that selective at­
tention does not operate very efficiently when novel 
items are selectedon the basis of color; a suggestion that 
is at odds with subjective experience and the literature 
on color pop-out (Carter, 1982; Humphries & Boucart, 
1997; Triesman & Gelade, 1.980; Wolfe, 1.994). Such an 
interpretation would also seen to predict higher error 
rates than the observed 1.6%. Moreover, this would lead 
to the prediction that a stimulus, seen one or more times 
as a distractor but never as a target, would produce sub­
stantial interference if paired with a novel target on a 
subsequent trial. As will be discussed below in (3), the 
data are at odds with this prediction.
2. Strayer, Drews, and Albert (2001.) assessed the im ­
plicit perceptual memory for words that were presented 
only once in the priming task, as either a target or a dis­
tractor. The implicit perceptual memory o f these items 
was measured by using a dot-clearing task immediately 
follow ing the prim ing task. In the dot-clearing task, 
words were initially masked and then slowly faded into 
view as the mask was gradually removed. The perceptual 
memory for each item was estimated by the time taken 
by participants to report the identity o f the word. Previ­
ous researchers using this dot-clearing paradigm have 
found that words previously attended are identified  
faster than new words and that these effects are long- 
lasting (e.g., Feustel, Shiffrin, & Salasoo, 1.983; Hawley 
& Johnston, 1991). In our study, we found that words 
that were presented as a target in the priming task were 
identified faster than control words that were not pre­
sented in the priming task [f(36) = 3.1,/? < .01]. By con­
trast, there was no difference in identification times for 
words that were presented as a distractor in the priming 
task and control words that were not presented in the 
priming task (p  > .70). Thus, the study by Strayer et al. 
dem onstrated strong im plicit perceptual memory for 
novel targets but provided no evidence for enhanced per­
ceptual facilitation of novel distractors.
3. Strayer and Grison (1.999; Experiment 3b) repeated 
an experimentally novel distractor from one to five times 
before presenting that stimulus as a target. Reliable neg­
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ative priming was never obtained; indeed, the priming 
effect averaged+5.4 msec across conditions. These data 
were considered to raise problems for both multiple- 
instance and recency-based episodic retrieval models of 
negative priming, because the only (and most recent) in­
stances of the probe target are as a d istractor on the 
prime trial(s). Neill and Joordens (2002) have suggested 
that the perceptual representations of the distractor be­
came activated and masked the effects of episodic re­
trieval. It is important to note, however, that the Strayer 
and Grison (1999, Experim ent 3b) study paired a re­
peated distractor with a novel target. If a distractor is re­
ceiving substantial facilitation, as suggested by Neill 
and Joordens, the literature on primed pop-out (Dark, 
Vochatzer, & Van Voorhis, 1996; DeWitt, 1994; Schwar- 
ting & Johnston, 1998) suggests that greater levels of in­
terference should be observed in the processing of the 
novel target (see, also, [ 1 J, above). Consequently, this 
predicts that both reaction time (RT) and error rate for 
the novel target should increase as a function of distrac­
tor repetition. From Strayer and Grison (1999, Experi­
ment 3b), we computed the RT means for sequences in 
which a distractor, repeated from one to five times, was 
paired with a novel target. The RT means and error rates 
(in parentheses) for D, DD, DDD, DDDD, and DDDDD 
sequences6 were 635 (4.9), 631 (4.9), 633 (4.3), 636 
(4.6), and 636 (4.4), respectively. A one-way analysis of 
variance revealed no difference as a function of distrac­
tor repetition for RT [F(4,196) = 0 3 1 ,p  > .80] or error 
rate [F(4,196) = 1.1, p  > .35]. That is, response to the 
novel target was unaffected by the number o f times that 
the distractor had been repeated. Thus, there is no evidence 
to support the assertion that the distractor was processed 
more fluently with repetition.
In sum, several lines of evidence cast doubt on Neill and 
Joordens’s (2002) assertion that the novel prime trial dis­
tractor was activatedsufficiently to obliterate any negative 
priming produced by episodic retrieval. These data are, 
however, consistent with activation-sensitive inhibitory 
models of negative priming (e.g., Houghton & Tipper, 
1994; Strayer & Grison, 1999) that suggest that the mech­
anisms underlying negative priming are engaged only 
when the distractor is highly activated and interferes with 
the processing of the target. Because the representations 
o f novel distractors are not highly activated, the mecha­
nisms underlying negative priming are not engaged.
Theoretical Issues
In this final section, we deal with several theoretical 
and methodological issues raised in the reply by Neill and 
Joordens (2002). First, Neill and Joordens argued that the 
distinction between inhibition-based and memory-based 
interpretations of negative priming has important con­
sequences. We completely agree. Not only might there 
be important implications for our understanding of cog­
nitive disorders, but these issues get at the basic archi­
tecture of human cognition. For example, how much of
our behavior is governed by episodic retrieval? What is 
stored in an episode? When is performance governedby 
the retrieval of multiple instances, and when is perfor­
mance governed by the retrieval o f the most recent in­
stance? To what extent does inhibition function to re­
solve response competition? W hich representations are 
inhibited? What are the mechanisms underlying this in­
hibition? These issues are fundamental to our under­
standing of human cognition.
Second, a problem with most theories of negative prim­
ing is that the processing assumptions are not formal­
ized in sufficient detail to derive specific predictions. 
Many times, the theories have ad hoc assumptions that 
allow the “theory” to account for everything but to pre­
dict nothing (rendering the models unfalsifiable). In­
deed, Neill and Joordens (2002) provided a classic ex­
ample of this sort o f problem. They proposed that the 
effects o f episodic retrieval and perceptual activation are 
o f sufficient magnitude to offset each other. Although 
this may be a plausible assumption (but see above), it is 
important to have independent evidence for this asser­
tion. Similarly, if Neill and Joordens have suggested that 
the effects o f recency-based episodic retrieval are dif­
ferent for novel and repeated items, there shouldbe some 
independent evidence for this assertion. As has been noted 
elsewhere (Grison & Strayer, 2002), theoretical progress 
in this area will be governedby the extent to which mod­
els of negative priming become more computationally 
explicit and make falsifiable predictions.
Third, we note that the episodic retrieval ideas stem 
from the seminal work o f Logan (1988,1992). With re­
spect to episodic retrieval, Logan (1988) made three pro­
cessing assumptions. First, attention to a stimulus is suf­
ficient to commit it to memory. Second, retrieval from 
memory is an obi igatory consequence of attention. Third, 
each encounter with a stimulus is encoded, stored, and 
retrieved as a separate episode or instance. Logan (1988) 
provided compel ling evidence for the storage of attended 
information. However, we question the plausibility of 
storing episodic traces of all distracting information (es­
pecially if  that inform ation is novel, can be selected 
against on the basis of simple perceptual attributes [e.g., 
color], and generates no response competition). The util­
ity of storing representations of all the irrelevant infor­
mation from the environment is unclear. Such an archi­
tecture would surely overwhelm the capacity of episodic 
memory. Even so, if one were to retrieve an episode with 
a “do not respond tag,” this would impair responding to 
that stimulus in the future.
Fourth, most o f the studies that Neill and Joordens 
(2002) pointed to as being problematic for inhibition- 
based theories of negative priming have a confound in 
which the task changes from the prime trial to the probe 
trial. There is a growing literature on task switching 
(e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995) that indicates that some 
o f the task-switching costs are elim inatedby predictable 
sequences, whereas other costs persist even if partici­
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pants know full well w hat the upcom ing task will be 
(e.g., Sohn & Carlson, 2000; Strayer & Kramer, 1994). 
Although the differences between distractor present and 
distractor absent on the probe trial are potentially very 
important, the effects o f  task switching on the m echa­
nisms underlying negative priming are unclear. Tipper 
and Cranston (1985) were aware of  these task-switching 
effects and argued that the selection set (i.e., task re ­
quirements) must be maintained in order to obtain neg­
a tive prim ing. T ipper  (1985) argued  for a response-  
b lock ing  model in which perceptual inputs are not 
suppressed but blocked from access to response m echa­
nisms (hence, the “response-blocking" model).
F ifth , Neill and Joordens (2002) cons trued  a — 1% 
error rate difference in Experiment 1 of Grison and Strayer 
(2002) as evidence that negative priming is obtained with 
novel items. However, this “negative-priming"effect was 
not obtained when the study was replicated/extended in 
Experiment 2 o f  Strayer and Grison (2002). Indeed, the 
analysis that collapsed across experiments revealed no 
negative priming with novel items in the experiments. In 
Grison and Strayer, there were 4 conditions in which 
novel ignored repetition conditions were used. With RT 
measures, 0 out o f  4 produced significant negative prim­
ing (in fact, all were slightly positive). With error rate 
measures, 1 out o f  4 produced significant negative prim­
ing (the other three produced slight positive priming); 
however, as was m entioned above, this anomaly was not 
replicated  with very sim ilar experimental conditions. 
Moreover, Malley and Strayer (1995) had 5 conditions in 
which novel ignored repetition conditions were used. 
With RT measures, 0 out o f  5 produced significant neg­
ative priming (all 5 were slightly positive). With error 
rate measures, 0 out of 5 produced significant negative 
priming (all 5 were slightly positive). In the experiments 
reported  by Strayer and Grison (1999), there were 10 
conditions in which novel ignored repetition conditions 
were used. With RT measures, 0 out of 10 produced sig­
nificant negative priming (7 out o f  10 produced slight 
positive priming). With error rate measures, 0 out of 10 
produced significant negative priming (6 out o f  10 pro­
duced slight positive priming). So the claim that nega­
tive priming was obtained with novel ignored repetition 
conditions and that this is “more easily accounted for by 
mismatch theories" seems to be a b i t  o f  an overstatement. 
If mismatch theories predict this “negative-priming" ef­
fect, then do the 37 out o f  38 cases in which it is not re ­
liably obtained constitute evidence against it? It seems 
pretty clear that a balanced perspective would interpret 
this as a Type I error, one that does not replicate between 
very similar experimental conditions.
Conclusions
Negative priming is reliably obtained with repeated 
items but is not obtained with novel items. These data 
raise problems for episodic retrieval theories, because 
they predict more negative priming with novel than with 
repeated items. Neill and Joordens’s (2002) suggestion
that perceptual activation masks the effects o f  episodic 
retrieval in novel conditions is contradicted by empirical 
evidence casting doubt on the claim that sufficient per­
ceptual activation is obta ined with novel distractors to 
obliterateany effects of episodicretrieval.  Moreover, Neill 
and Joordens’s position fails to account for the robust 
negative priming obtained with repeated items. We believe 
that the m ost  s tra igh tfo rw ard  in terpre tat ion  o f  these 
stimulus repetition effects is one based on activation- 
sensitive inhibition, similar to that originally proposed 
by Houghton and Tipper (1994).
REFERENCES
Carter. R. C  (1982). Visual search with color. Journal of Experi­
mental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 8,1 27-136. 
Dai.rympff-Ai .ford, R C„ & Budavr. D. (1966). Hxamination of 
some aspects of the Stroop color-word test. Perceptual & Motor 
Skills, 23, 1211-1214.
D ark. V. J.. V ocfiatzfr.K . G., & Van Voorfiis, B. A. (1996). Seman­
tic and spatial components of attention. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 22, 63-81. 
Df.Witt, M. J. (1994). Attention capture by primed and unprimed stim­
uli. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Utah. 
F fu s tf f ,  T. C„ Sfiiffrin , R M„ & Safasoo, A. ( 1983). iipisodic and 
lexical contributions to the repetition effect in word identification. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 112, 309-346.
Fox. F_ (1995). Negative priming from ignored distractors in visual 
selection: A review. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2, 145-173. 
Grison. S.. & S trav f.r, D. I.. (2002). Negative priming and perceptual 
fluency: More than what meets the eye. Perception & Psychophysics, 
63, 1063-1071.
Hawi.f.v. K. J.. & Jo h n s to n . W. A. (1991). Long-term perceptual 
memory for briefly exposed words as a function of awareness and 
attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception
& Performance, 17, 807-815.
Houghton. G., & Tippfr, S. P. (1994). A model of inhibitory mecha­
nisms in selective attention. In II Dagenbach & T. H. Carr (iids.). 
Inhibitory processes in attention, memory', and language (pp. 53­
11 2). San Diego: Academic Press.
H oughton . G., Tippfr. S. P.. W favfr, B., & Spiorf, D. I. (1996). In­
hibition and interference in selective attention: Some tests of a 
neural network model. Visual Cognition, 3, 119-164.
Humph Rifs. G. W„ & B oucart.M . (1997). Selection by color and form 
in vision. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & 
Performance, 23, 136-153.
Kramfr, A. F. & Stravf.r. D. I.. (2001). Influence of stimulus repe­
tition on negative priming. Psychology & Aging, 16, 580-587. 
Logan. G. D. (1988). Towards an instance theory of automatization.
Psychological Review, 95, 492-527.
1-OGan.G. D. (1992). Shapes of reaction-time distributionsand shapes 
of learning curves: A test of the instance theory of automaticity. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Perfor­
mance, 18, 883-914.
Lowf, D. G. (1979). Strategies, context, and the mechanism of re­
sponse inhibition.Memory & Cognition, 7, 382-389.
Ma i.i .f.v.G. B., & St rayfr, D. 1.(1995). iiffect of stimulus repetition on 
positive and negative identity priming. Perception & Psychophysics, 
57, 657-667.
May, C. P.. Kanf, M. J.. & Haspifr, I.. (1995). Determinants of nega­
tive priming. Psychological Bulletin, 118, 35-54.
Mii.i .ikf.n,B., Joordf.ns,S., Mf.riki.f..RM..& Si IFfi Ri. A  F_ (1998). 
Selective attention: A reevaluation of the implications of negative 
priming. Psychological Review, 105, 203-229.
Nf.ii.f, W. T. (1977). Inhibitory and facilitatory processes in selective 
attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & 
Performance, 3, 444-450.
Nf.ii.f , W. T„ & Joordf.ns. S. (2002). Negative priming and stimulus
NOTES AND COM M ENT 865
repetitions: A reply to Grison and Strayer (2001). Perception & Psy­
chophysics, 64, 855-860.
Neill. W. T.. & Mathis. K. M. (1998). Transfer-inappropriate pro­
cessing: Negative priming and related phenomena. In D. I.. Medin 
(lid.), The psychology of teaming and motivation: Advances in re­
search and theory (Vol. 38, pp. 1 -44). San Diego: Academic Press.
Nf.i u .. W. T.. & Valdes. I.. A. (1992). The persistence of negative 
priming: Steady-state or decay? Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning. Memory. & Cognition, 18, 565-576.
Nf.i u .. W. T.. Valdes. I.. A.. & Terry. K. M. (1995). Selective atten­
tion and the inhibitory control of cognition. In I-'. N. Dempster & 
C. J. Brainerd (lids.). New perspectives on interference and inhibi­
tion in cognition (pp. 207-261). New York: Academic Press.
Nf.ii.i .. W. T.. Valdes. I.. A.. Terry. K. M. & Gorfein. D. S. (1992). 
Persistence of negative priming: II. Hvidence for episodic trace re­
trieval. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning. Memory. & 
Cognition, 18, 993-1000.
Rogers. R.. & M o n s fll .  S. (1995). Costs of a predictable switch be­
tween simple cognitive tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 124, 207-231.
S cfiw arting . I. S.. & Jofinsi on. W. A. (1998). Spontaneous attention 
to primed and nonprimed inputs. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,
5, 295-299.
Sofin. M. H.. & Carlson. R. A. (2000). Hffects of repetition and fore­
knowledge on task-set reconfiguration. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning. Memory. & Cognition, 26, 1445-1460.
Stravf.r.D. I-.. Drews. F. A..& Albert.R W. (2001). Negative prim­
ing and perceptual facilitation. Abstracts of the Psychonomic Soci­
ety,6, 113.
S tra y e r .  D. I... & G rison. S. (1999). Negative priming is contingent 
on stimulus repetition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception & Performance, 25, 24-38.
S tra y e r .  D. I... & G rison. S. (2002). Negative priming is not based 
upon perceptual inhibition. Manuscript submitted for publication.
S tra y e r .  D. I... & K ram er. A. F. (1994). Strategies and automaticity:
II. Dynamic aspects of strategy adjustment. Journal of Experimen­
tal Psychology: Learning. Memory. & Cognition, 20, 342-365.
Tipper. S. P. (1985). The negative priming effect: Inhibitory priming 
by ignored objects. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
37A, 571-590.
Tipper.S. P.. & C ran sto n . M. (1985). Selective attention and priming: 
Inhibitory and facilitatory effects of ignored primes. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 37 A, 591-611.
Trifsman. A.. & G fladf.G . (1980). A feature integration theory of 
attention. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 97-136.
Wolff. J. (1994). Guided Search 2.0: A revised model of visual search. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1, 202-238.
NOTES
1. One problem with theories of negative priming is that the pro­
cessing assumptions are often poorly articulated and change between
publications (and sometimes within the same article). For example,
sometimes it is assumed that performance is based on the retrieval of 
multiple instances (Neill & Valdes, 1992). Other times, performance 
is assumed to be based on the retrieval of the most recent instance 
(Neill & Mathis, 1998).
2. This recency-based model predicts greater within-condition vari­
ability (i.e., variability from trial to trial within condition) on control 
trials than on ignored repetition trials, because performance on the for­
mer could be facilitated or impeded by episodic retrieval, whereas per­
formance on the latter would only be impeded by episodic retrieval. 
We tested this prediction by using the data from Strayer and Grison 
(1999, Hxperiment 1). In this experiment, novel and repeated condi­
tions were factorially combined with control, ignored repetition, and 
attended repetition conditions. The means and within-condition stan­
dard deviations for novel stimuli were 617 (112), 615 (115), and 568 
(104) for control, ignored repetition, and attended repetition condi­
tions, respectively. The means and within-condition standard devia­
tions for repeated stimuli were 554 (92), 577 (96), and 556 (96) for 
control, ignored repetition, and attended repetition conditions, re­
spectively. With respect to recency-based episodic retrieval models of 
negative priming, the data did not conform as predicted. In particular, 
in the repeated stimulus ensemble the within-condition variability for 
control (92) and ignored repetition (96) conditions was in the opposite 
direction from that predicted by the recency-based episodic retrieval 
model, although this difference was not reliable |/(29)= 1.21 ,p > .201.
3. We are in agreement with Neill and Joordens (2002) that the locus 
of negative-priming effects is in the response-based componentof pro­
cessing. Indeed, our HRP studies of negative priming (Strayer & Gri­
son, 2002) offer some of the most direct evidence for a postperceptual 
locus for the mechanisms underlying negative priming. However, we 
are in disagreement concerning how these mechanisms operate to im­
pede response-related processes.
4. If one were to argue that the levels of perceptual activation were 
not yet asymptotic with repeated stimuli, this would result in an un­
derestimation of the magnitude of the episodic retrieval effect and, 
consequently, an underestimation of the amount of facilitation pro­
duced by a novel prime trial distractor.
5. There is no mechanism specified a priori to suggest that episodic 
retrieval mechanisms differ for repeated and novel items. If there are 
differences in recency-based episodic retrieval for novel and repeated 
items, it would be important to develop a principled theoretical ac­
count for why this is the case. Just stating that this is warranted by the 
data is inadequate, liven so, if Neill and Joordens (2002) have sug­
gested that there may be differences in the effects of episodic retrieval 
for novel and repeated items, it would seem to render their theory 
untestable.
6. In our terminology, each "D” refers to a trial in which the dis­
tractor was paired with a novel target. Thus, DDDDD would refer to a 
trial in which a novel target was paired with a distractor that had been 
presented on trials N, N— 1, N—2, N— 3, and N—4.
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